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Abstract
We study an economy in which exchange occurs pairwise, there is no commitment, and
anonymous agents choose between random monetary trade or deterministic credit trade.
To accomplish the latter, agents can exploit a costly technology that allows limited recordkeeping and enforcement. An equilibrium with money and credit is shown to exist if the cost
of using the technology is suﬃciently small. Anonymity, record-keeping and enforcement
limitations also permit some incidence of default, in equilibrium.
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Introduction

This paper considers a variant of the monetary search model in Shi (1995) and Trejos and
Wright (1995), in order to study the coexistence between money and credit in a decentralized
trading environment. The variations considered partially relax some of the frictions that are
assumed in the typical model. Specifically, we maintain the assumption of no commitment
and pairwise matches, but we introduce a costly technology as in Camera (2000), which allows
deterministic matches, some enforcement, and an improvement in record-keeping. So, ‘creditlike’ trades become possible among anonymous partners, and these trades can coexist with
monetary exchange in equilibrium.
The model is as follows. If agents can produce during a period, then they can opt to exploit
the costly technology instead of trading as in the typical monetary search model. The former
option generates disutility for the period, but also allows these agents to be anonymously paired
as a potential consumer or producer, in each of two consecutive periods. An agent’s initial
role is determined by a coin flip and is reversed in the second period. In a credit trade, initial
producers (creditors) transfer consumption to their partners (debtors), and these promise to
reciprocate with transfers to whomever will be their next-period partner. Debtors may not wish
to meet their obligations, and default may arise due to limitations in record-keeping and some
enforcement. Agents who did not keep promises in their last credit trade are assigned a bad
credit record, as opposed to good. If they attempt another credit trade, then the technology
may recognize them; this triggers a one-time utility sanction and resets their record to good.
The analysis shows that for suﬃciently small costs of the technology, equilibrium outcomes
arise in which credit trades coexist with monetary exchange. These outcomes, however, display
some incidence of default. The intuition is as follows. In the model, transfers are assumed to
satisfy take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers from consumers to producers. So, transfers reflect producers’
continuation payoﬀs, which depend not only on the enforcement parameters but also on the
cost of credit trading. This cost must be suﬃciently low or the expected return from credit
would not be suﬃciently attractive relative to monetary trade. The return from credit, however,
cannot be too high or no one would sell for money. Thus, there must also be some default, which
means that enforcement cannot be perfect. Indeed, we characterize the trade-oﬀ between the
technology’s cost and enforcement capabilities in sustaining equilibria with money and credit.
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This analysis contributes to a monetary literature concerned with how the availability of
credit aﬀects allocations, and the role of money. In one strand of this literature, credit is sustained thanks to financial intermediaries that are introduced in otherwise competitive economies
with frictions (e.g., see Azariadis et al., 2001, Jafarey and Rupert, 2001, or Bullard and Smith,
2003). In another strand, random meetings, anonymity, no commitment and enforcement limitations provide explicit microfoundations for money. Here, if individual trading histories are
public, then any monetary allocation could be replicated without money, while there can be no
credit if histories are private (Kocherlakota, 1998). To open the door to credit and money, some
of this work introduces imperfect or partial knowledge of individual histories. For example, in
Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) individual histories are made public only with a lag, which
lessens the threat of punishment for defectors and sustains equilibria with money and credit.
In the mechanism design analysis of Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a,b), instead, money (inside
or outside) coexists with credit because only a subset of agents has public histories. Yet other
examples on the coexistence of money and credit introduce what basically amounts to a limited
participation friction in a prototypical banking sector (e.g., Cavalcanti et al. 1999, Williamson
1999, 2004), or alternatively consider various possibilities of long-term partnerships (e.g., Shi
1996, Li 2001, Corbae and Ritter 2004).
Our paper adds to this literature by providing a further example of coexistence of money and
credit, though we do not employ a mechanism design analysis. Our framework is in the tradition
of the microfoundations of money literature, and displays pairwise exchange, anonymity, private
histories, no commitment, and enforcement limitations. Anonymity and no commitment open
the door to default, and money is used in trade only by some agents, as in some of the existing
studies that have introduced some knowledge of individual histories, limited participation, or
long-term partnerships. Unlike those studies, credit-like trades in our model are made possible
thanks to the introduction of a costly technology that improves upon the random meeting process
and also permits some limited record-keeping and enforcement. It is these limitations, as well
as anonymity, that let money coexist with credit in our model.
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The Model

The basic layout combines the models in Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) with the
variation in Camera (2000). Time is discrete and continues forever and there is a unit-mass
continuum of non-storable commodities and infinitely-lived individuals, who are anonymous
and specialize in consumption/production. Agents and commodities are uniformly distributed
among N ≥ 3 diﬀerent sets denoted i = 1, ..., N and we refer to any agent from set i as agent
i. Agent i consumes commodity i and can produce commodity i + 1 (modulo N ), has period
utility u(q) from q ≥ 0 consumption and suﬀers disutility q from producing q ≥ 0. Assume
u(q) is strictly increasing, concave, twice diﬀerentiable, u(0) = 0, u (0) = ∞, and u(q) ≥ q for
q ∈ [0, q̂]. The common discount rate is r > 0.
Initially, a population fraction m ∈ (0, 1) has one indivisible unit of fiat money, while the
remaining agents can produce q ≥ 0 units of their specific commodity. In order to avoid multiple
asset holdings, we make the standard assumption that an agent can produce only if he has no
money and can hold at most one unit of money. So, we call producer someone without money
and consumer everyone else. At the end of the initial date, agents with money are free to discard
it, in order to become producers.
There are two spatially separated trading sectors, denoted spot and credit market. Only
producers can choose to trade in the credit market, while everyone else must trade in the spot
market. The spot market is a standard search economy in which trade histories are unobservable,
and there is neither commitment nor enforcement (e.g. Shi 1995 or Trejos and Wright 1995). In
particular, meetings are random and such that the probability of a meeting is simply the sum of
the population fraction of agents present in the spot market. For simplicity it is assumed that
in every meeting a type i agent is matched with probability
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to (a randomly selected) agent of

type i + 1 and of type i − 1 (mod. N) otherwise. So, even if all matches are single coincidence,
meetings are diﬃcult if few people trade in the spot market.
The credit market makes use of a technology that allows some partial record-keeping, better
matching and limited enforcement. Producers who access it on date t suﬀer φ > 0 disutility
and must remain in it until the end of date t + 1. The disutility φ is assumed to accrue upon
entrance, because we interpret it as the cost of operating a technology that lessens some of the
frictions present in the spot market. Specifically, the technology’s features are as follows.
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Record keeping. The technology keeps only a partial record of every agent’s credit market
history; it includes the last dates on which he entered and exited the credit market, his match
on those dates and the actions taken. Given their record, agents can have one of four possible
labels on date t ≥ 1. Those who last entered the credit market on t − 1 and are still present
at the start of t, can be labeled either debtors or creditors. Agent i is a debtor if on t − 1 he
met some agent i − 1, and is a creditor if he met some agent i + 1. Agents who last exited the
credit market at the end of date τ ≤ t − 1 can be labeled as having either a bad or a good credit
record, denoted j = b, g. This depends on their actions and labels on date τ . Agent i has a good
record (j = g) if on date τ he was either a creditor, a debtor who produced for some creditor
i + 1, or was sanctioned for having a bad record (more below). He has a bad record (j = b) if
on date τ he was a debtor who defaulted, i.e., did not produce for some creditor i + 1. Thus,
creditors who suﬀer a default do not consume in their second date on the credit market and
start the following date as producers with credit record g.
Enforcement and matching. Consider credit market participants on date t. Some entered
on date t − 1 and some are new entrants. The former are debtors or creditors and the technology
pairs each debtor of type i to a randomly selected creditor of type i + 1. Those who entered
now, on date t, are all producers and, upon entrance, the technology checks their credit record.
Good records are correctly identified but a bad record is identified as good with probability
1 − θ ∈ (0, 1). Those recognized as having a good record must stay in the market for two
periods. On the first (date t) they are matched among themselves as in the spot market, so
producer i meets a (randomly selected producer) type i + 1 or i − 1, according to a coin flip.
Those recognized as having a bad record are imposed a one-time utility loss, their record is reset
to g and must exit the credit market at the end of the period (they can return in the future).
Summing up, producers or money holders can trade in the spot market, as in the typical
search monetary model. Producers can opt to engage in a two-period sequence of unilateral
transfers on a credit market where a costly technology allows better matching as well as imperfect
record-keeping and enforcement. A transfer received (given) in the first period represents a loan
and makes the producer a debtor (creditor). Debtor i’s repayment obligation is discharged in
the second period via a transfer to any creditor i + 1. Debtors may skip repayment but risk a
future one-period utility sanction. Creditors who suﬀer a default do not consume for the period.
4

The assumed restrictions on record-keeping reduce the set of possible histories, the state space,
hence complexity. Anonymity, enforcement and record-keeping limitations, instead, open the
door to default and to the coexistence of money and credit.
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Stationary Equilibria

To discuss the coexistence of money and credit we will restrict attention to subgame perfect
equilibria in which (i) strategies are time-invariant and symmetric across agent types, (ii) both
trading sectors are active, and (iii) money circulates on the spot market.1
At the beginning of each date an agent can be in one of six possible states. He can be in the
credit market, as a creditor or a debtor. Or he can be outside the credit market as a producer
or a money holder with (credit) record j. We say that the agent is a ‘defaulter’ if j = b. Let
Gp and Gm denote the beginning-of-period stationary population fractions (for any agent type
i) of producers and money holders with record j = g; for defaulters we use Bp , Bm . On the
credit market, the population fractions of creditors and debtors are denoted Pc and Pd . Letting
α ∈ [0, 1] be the equilibrium probability that the representative debtor repays the debt, we have
that the population fraction αPc represents creditors who get repayment, and (1 − α) Pc are
creditors who suﬀer a default.
In (monetary) equilibrium we must have
m

= Gm + Bm ,

1−m

= Gp + Bp + Pd + Pc .

(1)

After the start of a period, producers choose a market. Let σj ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that
the representative producer with record j selects the credit market. So, the population fraction
Pp ≡ Gp (1 − σg ) + Bp (1 − σb ),
comprises spot market producers. The fraction Gp σg + Bp σb (1 − θ) includes producers who enter
the credit market and are recognized as having a good record. During each period, these agents
are equally likely to become creditors or debtors, so
Pc = Pd = P ≡
1

Gp σg + Bp σb (1 − θ)
.
2

Previous research suggests that several types of stationary outcomes can arise in the model, with one or both

markets active, depending on the size of φ (see Camera, 2000).
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The population fraction Bp σb θ is producers with record b who enter the credit market and
are sanctioned. Clearly, if both sectors are active and money is valued, then we must have
P ∈ (0, 1 − m).

3.1

Value Function

In the credit market, let qc and qd denote the first and second period equilibrium transfers
between producers, i.e., the loan and the repayment; let qp denote the utility penalty imposed
on producers found to have a bad record. In the spot market, let qm denote the commodities
that trade for money in equilibrium.
Denote the stationary end-of-period expected lifetime utility as Vj,k for an agent who starts
next period in state (j, k) with k = p, m (producer or money holder); use Vd and Vc for those
starting next period as debtors or creditors. Also, let ΠSj and Πj denote (expected) trade
surpluses, in the spot and credit market, to producers with record j. In equilibrium
rVj,p = σj (Πj − ΠSj ) + ΠSj
rVd = max(−qd + Vg,p − Vd , Vb,p − Vd )

(2)

rVc = Vg,p − Vc + αu(qd )
rVj,m =

Pp
2 [u(qm ) + Vj,p

− Vj,m ]

The right hand sides of these functional equations display expected flow returns from trade.
The first line shows that, at the start of any date, a producer with record j earns ΠSj surplus on
the spot market. Entering the credit market (with probability σj ) gives Πj − ΠSj surplus. The
next two lines show that a debtor can repay qd or can default, and then leaves the credit market;
a creditor gets repayment qd with probability α and starts next date as a producer with record
g. The last line is the value to having a money to those with record j; a spot trade consumption
opportunity arises with probability

Pp
2 ,

and the agent buys qm consumption.

In the expressions above
ΠSj =

m
2 (Vj,m

− qm − Vj,p ),

Πg = −φ + 12 (Vd + u(qc ) − Vg,p ) + 12 (Vc − qc − Vg,p ),

(3)

Πb = −φ + (1 − θ)[ 12 (Vd + u(qc ) − Vb,p ) + 12 (Vc − qc − Vb,p )] + θ(Vg,p − qp − Vb,p ).

The expected surplus to a spot market producer, ΠSj , depends on his record j, the strategies
of others, and the distribution of agents. With probability
6

m
2

he meets a buyer with money;

voluntary selling generates net payoﬀ Vj,m −qm −Vj,p ≥ 0. In all other encounters, the producer’s
net payoﬀ is zero. The second and third lines describe the expected surplus to producers with
record g and b who enter the credit market, given σj > 0 for some j. After suﬀering disutility
φ their credit records are checked. With probability θ a defaulter is discovered, sanctioned qp
and leaves the market. Unrecognized defaulters are free to trade as producers g, and are equally
likely to consume or produce.

3.2

Terms of trade, best responses and distribution of agents

Terms of trade are determined via bilateral negotiations assumed to satisfy take-it-or-leave-it
(TOL) oﬀers from consumers to producers. On the spot market trading histories are private
information so the equilibrium oﬀer qm cannot depend on producers’ records, unless their distribution across markets is degenerate. Hence, oﬀers may leave unequal surpluses to producers
with diﬀerent records. To see why, a buyer with money selects qm ∈ {qg,m , qb,m } where
qj,m = Vj,m − Vj,p , for j = b, g
i.e., the optimal oﬀer leaves no surplus to at least some producers. No other oﬀer can increase
the probability of a purchase, without decreasing the buyer’s expected gain. Since all buyers
face the same matching probabilities, qm is independent of the buyer’s record.
The optimal oﬀer qm of a buyer with credit record j is unique and must maximize his
expected surplus, contingent on a random match with a producer:
qm = arg max{[Vj ,p + u(xm ) − Vj ,m ](Bp 1b + Gp 1g ) : xm = qg,m , qb,m }

(4)

where 1j = 1 if Vj,m − xm ≥ Vj,p and 0 otherwise.
Now consider the credit market. Only producers recognized as g can trade, so
qc = Vc − Vg,p and qd = Vg,p − Vd ,

(5)

because of TOL oﬀers. Thus, if Vg,p > Vb,p , then the undetected defaulters may earn surplus
from lending. We also define the utility sanction by qp where
qp = Vg,p − Vb,p .
So, discovered defaulters simply earn no surplus for the period.
7

(6)

Now let {α , σj } denote the representative agent’s best responses given that everybody else
selects {α, σj } and the terms of trade are as above. Individual optimality requires
α = arg max{x(Vg,p − qd − Vb,p ) : x ∈ [0, 1]},
σj = arg max{x(Πj − ΠSj ) : x ∈ [0, 1]},

(7)

u(qm ) + Vj,p ≥ Vj,m .
The last inequality ensures that it is optimal to spend money, instead of holding on to it.
The population fraction Gp is time-invariant if
Bp σb θ + αPd + Pc + Gm

Pp
2

− Gp σg − Gp (1 − σg ) m
2 =0

(8)

The inflows include four terms. The term Bp σb θ is the sanctioned producers b (who become g);
αPd +Pc accounts for debtors who do not default and creditors since they both become producers
g; Gm accounts for money holders g who spend money in the spot market. The outflows are
producers g who choose credit and those who sell for money. Time-invariance of Bp requires
(1 − α) Pd + Bm

Pp
2

− Bp σb − Bp (1 − σb ) m
2 = 0,

(9)

where (1 − α) Pd are debtors who default and become producers b and Bp σb accounts for the
fact that every producer b who enters the credit market changes state, either due to sanctioning
or confusion over his record. Finally, Gm and Bm are time invariant if
Pp
Gp (1 − σg ) m
2 − Gm 2 = 0,

Pp
Bp (1 − σb ) m
2 − Bm 2 = 0.

(10)

We are now ready to present a definition of equilibrium.
Definition 1 Given (θ, φ), a symmetric stationary equilibrium with coexistence of money and
credit (an equilibrium, for short) is a list of strategies {α, σb , σg }, quantities {qc , qd , qm , qp }, value
functions {Vc , Vd , Vj,m , Vj,p }j=b,g , and distribution of agents {Pc , Pd , Gk , Bk }k=m,p that satisfy
(1)-(10), P ∈ (0, 1 − m), and {α , σb , σg } = {α, σb , σg }.

4

The coexistence of money and credit

In equilibrium money and credit coexist, so we must have qc > 0 (there must be credit) and
0 < Pp < 1−m (there must be producers on both markets). Several equilibrium strategy vectors
8

{α, σb , σg } are possible. The next result narrows down the set of strategies compatible with this
equilibrium (all proofs are in the appendix).
Lemma 1 If an equilibrium exists, then it must have the following characteristics: (i) α ∈ (0, 1)
and 0 < σb < σg = 1; (ii) Vc > Vg,p > Vb,p = Vd = 0 and Vg,m > Vb,m > 0; and (iii) qm = Vb,m .
Two features of the equilibrium stand out. First, if money and credit coexist, then there
must be some default. Intuitively, deterministic credit trade is preferable to random spot trade.
This implies that a good credit record is valuable, as it ensures unfettered access to deterministic
trading. It also implies that α < 1. If, in fact, debt-repayment is always individually optimal,
then the resulting absence of default removes any incentive to trade on the spot market. Of
course α > 0, or lending would be suboptimal due to the absence of any future repayment. To
see why, notice that certain default cannot be an equilibrium because discounting would imply
Vc < Vg,p , hence qc < 0.
Second, only producers with credit record b trade in the spot market and hold all the money.
Due to take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers, the value to being a producer b must thus be zero, so the value
of money must satisfy qm = Vb,m > 0. The latter is uniquely defined by the solution to
qm −

Pp
2r+Pp u(qm )

= 0,

(11)

which satisfies the individual optimality condition u(qm ) + Vj,p ≥ Vj,m . Note also that in
equilibrium producers g would not sell for money on the spot market because Vb,m < Vg,m . We
are now in a position to discuss existence of equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If φ is suﬃciently small, then an equilibrium with money and credit exists. In
equilibrium the loan and repayment amounts qc and qd must satisfy
u(qc ) =

φ[2(1+r)−θ]
(1+r)(1−θ)

and

qd =

φθ
(1+r)(1−θ) .

(12)

The central result is that an equilibrium with money and credit exists as long as the technology used to sustain credit trading is suﬃciently inexpensive. Credit, in this case, is granted
despite the fact that there is some default in equilibrium and bad loans have no residual value.
The intuition is simple. Producers trade oﬀ the direct cost generated by credit trades with
the indirect cost associated to random monetary spot exchange. If credit market transactions
9

are cheap, then there is a threshold level of default below which those who have a good record
strictly prefer to avoid random monetary trade. Those who have defaulted, instead, are simply
indiﬀerent to trading locations; their continuation payoﬀ is zero whether they sell for money
(due to TOL oﬀers) or if they attempt to get credit (due to enforcement). This last feature,
explains why there is default in equilibrium. The continuation payoﬀ to those who repay debts
is zero (due to TOL oﬀers), so they are indiﬀerent to defaulting.

Figure 1
We illustrate our findings with the help of Figure 1 drawn for u(q) =

√
q and r = .01. The

area under the curve indicates regions of the parameter space (φ, θ) under which an equilibrium
is possible. Note that φ must be suﬃciently small, and that, given φ, we must have θ ∈ (θ, θ) ⊂
(0, 1). The reason for this latter finding is that as θ → 0 then there is no sanctioning for default,
so α > 0 cannot be individually optimal. The opposite is true when θ → 1, since defaulters
would never access the credit market. Notice also that, for this parameterization, there can be
two values of θ that are consistent with the same equilibrium default rate α. Intuitively, all else
equal, the more diﬃcult is to sanction defaulters, i.e., the lower is θ, the greater is the incentive
for debtors to not reciprocate for the original transfer (loan). This, in turn reduces the incentive
to lend. We see from (12) that both qc and qd fall as θ falls. It follows that if θ is low, a given α
can be sustained in equilibrium only if the transfers are also low. If θ is high, instead, defaulters
are sanctioned suﬃciently often that the amount of credit granted can be much higher.
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5

Final remarks

This article provides a further example of the coexistence of money and credit in an economy with
frictions and pairwise exchange. The model is in the tradition of the microfoundations of money
literature, and it assumes pairwise exchange among anonymous agents who face commitment,
enforcement and informational limitations. Previous work has explored the coexistence of money
and credit in similar frameworks by either introducing imperfect public knowledge of individual
histories, or limited participation, or the possibility of long-term partnerships. In our model,
instead, credit-like trades are made possible thanks to the introduction of a costly technology
that can be freely selected by any agent who can produce. This technology improves upon the
random meeting process and also permits some limited record-keeping and enforcement. It is
these limitations, as well as anonymity, that allow money to coexist with credit in our model.
We conclude with three comments. First, the model admits multiple equilibria; for instance,
there can be outcomes in which there is only credit or only money. Second, changes in the
quantity of money do not aﬀect equilibrium consumption on the credit market (see (12)), for
two reasons. Changes in money do not meaningfully aﬀect the outside options of credit market
participants since producers g never sell for money and producers b never earn surplus by selling
for money (due to TOL bargaining). Changes in money also do not aﬀect credit meetings, as
these do not depend on the proportion of market participants. Finally, we conjecture that if bad
loans had some residual value, then repayment could be unnecessary to sustain credit. Suppose,
for instance, that creditors who suﬀer a default could receive some small consumption q < qd at a
later date. This could be accomplished by forcing discovered defaulters to produce or by taxing
all credit market participants. If agents are patient enough, then even the certainty of default
could sustain an equilibrium with money and credit. In addition, bad loans could conceivably
circulate as a form of valuable inside money, even if their residual worth is minimal.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider outcomes as in Definition 1 and use the expressions in (2)-(3).
1. Clearly, qc > 0, or no one would enter the credit market because φ > 0. Since qc = Vc −Vg,p ,
then we need Vc > Vg,p . We must also have α > 0. If in fact α = 0, then Vc =

Vg,p
1+r

and

so qc = Vc − Vg,p < 0, a contradiction. For α > 0 to be individually optimal we need
−qd + Vg,p ≥ Vb,p ; since qd = Vg,p − Vd , then it follows that Vd = 0 and so Vb,p = 0. The
latter also implies ΠSb = Πb = 0. Clearly, ΠSb = 0 requires qm = Vb,m (since Vb,p = 0).
2. Proving that α < 1. Suppose that, in fact, α = 1. Here all producers have record g.
In order for money to have value some producers g must sell on the spot market, so we
need σg ∈ (0, 1), which requires Πg = ΠSg = rVg,p . Take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers then imply
qm = Vg,m − Vg,p ; so, ΠSg = 0 = Πg = Vg,p . But then, since qd = Vg,p − Vd = Vg,p , we would
have qd = 0, which implies Vc =

Vg,p
1+r

= 0 and so qc = 0, a contradiction. Therefore we

must have α ∈ (0, 1).
3. Proving that σj > 0 for j = b, g. When α ∈ (0, 1) we have Bp , Gp > 0 and, clearly, we
cannot have σb = σg = 0. Suppose that σg > σb = 0. This contradicts the stationarity
condition (9), since the fraction of producers b would increase over time (due to default
and absence of sanctioning). A similar contradiction arises if σb > σg = 0. Hence, we must
have σj > 0 for j = b, g. The latter implies rVg,p = Πg . Of course, Vg,p > 0 or else we
would have qd = 0, and so Vc = qc = 0, which is not an equilibrium.
4. Proving that σg = 1 and σb ∈ (0, 1). Recall that α ∈ (0, 1) and Vb,p = Πb = ΠSb = 0.
Suppose that, in fact, σg ∈ (0, 1). In this case we must have ΠSg = Πg = rVg,p , by
individual optimality. Using (2), we get Vg,m − Vb,m ≤ Vg,p whenever Vg,p ≥ 0 = Vb,p .
Hence, ΠSg =

m
2 (Vg,m − Vb,m − Vg,p )

≤ 0, which implies Vg,p ≤ 0, a contradiction. To prove

σb ∈ (0, 1) suppose that, in fact, σb = 1. Then Pp = 0 because σg = 1. So Vj,m = 0 for
j = b, g, which is not an equilibrium. Hence, Pp = Bp (1 − σb ) , Gm = 0 and Bm = m. It
is immediate from (2) that Vg,m > Vb,m > 0 for qm > 0 satisfying (11).
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Proof of Proposition 1
Use Lemma 1 and note that in equilibrium Vg,p =
that Πb = 0 if

2φ
1−θ

u(qc )−2φ
1+2r

< u(qc ). The last line in (3) indicates

− Vg,p = u(qc ). Substitute for Vg,p to get
u(qc ) =

φ[2(1+r)−θ]
(1+r)(1−θ) ,

so u(qc ) > 2φ for all r, θ, and Vg,p > 0. We conclude that the equilibrium qc solving (12) is
unique, positive, and increases in θ, φ, r. Given (12) we obtain
Vg,p =

φθ
(1+r)(1−θ) .

(13)

From the third line in (2) we must have αu(qd ) > Vc − Vg,p = qc , or else Vc < 0. Since
qd = Vg,p , we need αu(Vg,p ) > qc . Given α ∈ (0, 1), note that αu(Vg,p ) − qc is hump-shaped in φ
and vanishes for φ = 0, which is when Vg,p = qc = 0. Note also that qc and Vg,p increase in φ.
By concavity of u and u (0) = ∞, we have αu(Vg,p ) > qc if φ is suﬃciently small.
In equilibrium σg = 1 is individually optimal if Πg ≥ ΠSg . Suppose a producer with record g
deviates and enters the spot market. Then, ΠSg = 0 since he would not sell for money. To see
it, notice that from (2) and (11) we have
Vg,m − Vg,p

=

Pp
2r
2r+Pp u(qm ) − 2r+Pp Vg,p

= qm −

2r
2r+Pp Vg,p ,

which implies Vg,m − qm < Vg,p . Since rVg,p = Πg > 0 in equilibrium, then Πg > ΠSg .
To complete the proof, note that α ∈ (0, 1) must satisfy qc = Vc − Vg,p > 0. Using qd = Vg,p
and Vc from (2) we get
Vc − Vg,p =
⇒

qc =

1
1+r [Vg,p

+ αu(Vg,p )] − Vg,p

1
1+r [αu(Vg,p ) − rVg,p ].

(14)

In equilibrium α ∈ (0, 1) must satisfy (14) given that qc satisfies (12) and Vg,p satisfies (13).
The unique qc and Vg,p that satisfy (12) and (13), are positive and constant in α. Define the RHS
of (14) by the continuous function f (α; θ, φ), increasing in α. Clearly f (0; θ, φ) < 0 < f (1; θ, φ).
Also, f (1; θ, φ) is hump-shaped in Vg,p , vanishing at Vg,p = 0 and at some other value Vg,p > 0.
Recall that qc and Vg,p increase in φ as well as θ and that qc , Vg,p → 0 as φ → 0 for any
given θ ∈ (0, 1). Since u is concave and u (0) = ∞, it follows that, given θ ∈ (0, 1), we have
qc < f(1; θ, φ) for φ > 0 suﬃciently small and qc ≥ f (1; θ, φ) for φ suﬃciently large. So, there
14

are suﬃciently small positive values φ, which depend on θ, such that f (0; θ, φ) < qc < f (1; θ, φ).
In that case, the intermediate value theorem implies that there exists a unique value of α ∈ (0, 1)
such that qc = f (α; θ, φ).
Now observe that Vg,p → 0 as θ → 0 and

∂Vg,p
∂θ

> 0; so, given φ > 0 we have that f (α; θ, φ) is

hump-shaped in θ, vanishing at θ = 0 and at some other value θ < 1. Hence, given φ > 0, there
are two values of θ ∈ (0, 1) that solve qc = f (α; θ, φ) because f (α; 0, φ) = 0 < qc |θ=0 while, for
θ suﬃciently close to one, we have qc > f (α; θ, φ) = 0. Using the implicit function theorem and
(14), we have that

dα
dθ

< 0, for the low value of θ, and

dα
dθ

> 0 otherwise.

Once we have α, we obtain σb by means of the laws of motion. Clearly, P = P ∗ =
Gp +Bp σb (1−θ)
,
2

Pp = Bp (1 − σb ), Gm = 0 and Bm = m. From (9) we get P (1 − α) = Bp σb

and so, using P , we get Gp = G∗p with
G∗p =

Bp σb [2−(1−α)(1−θ)]
.
1−α

It is easy to see that (8) is always satisfied by P = P ∗ and Gp = G∗p . Finally, the constraint (1)
with P = P ∗ and Gp = G∗p gives us
1 − m = Bp {1 + σb [3 + θ + α(1 − 3θ)]}.
There is a continuum of pairs (Bp , σb ) ∈ (0, 1 − m) × (0, 1) that satisfies the above. As (Bp , σb )
change, then qm changes since Pp changes. Thus the equilibrium pairs (Bp , σb ) must satisfy
Vg,m ≥ Vg,p , i.e., those with money at the end of the initial date (who have never defaulted in
the past) keep it instead of becoming a producer g. The inequality gives
Pp
2r+Pp [u(qm ) + Vg,p ]

≥ Vg,p ,

which is satisfied if φ is suﬃciently small, i.e., if Vg,p is suﬃciently small.
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